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THE VANISHING FREEDOM TO CHOOSE 




An individual’s right to choose a contractual partner marks an intersection 
between fundamental rights and basic contract law. As a fundamental right, the 
freedom to choose is emblematic of individual liberty and personal autonomy, 
values that lie at the core of a liberal society. The freedom to choose a 
contractual partner also contributes to a principal goal of the law of contract by 
enabling individuals to satisfy their preferences through market transactions. 
Using freedom of contract, everyone can choose from whom to purchase an 
item or service. Yet the right to choose a contractual partner also implies the 
right to reject someone. To enjoy an unfettered choice, a person must be able to 
reject a partner for good reasons, bad reasons, or no reasons at all. This power 
of rejection has impacts on others: the rejected partner may be denied an 
opportunity to obtain a job, or prevented from obtaining a valued service, or 
even deprived of an essential need such as food and shelter. Sometimes these 
adverse consequences result from efficient and rational decisions: the candidate 
for the job was rejected because the employer reasonably believed another 
applicant was superior. These adverse consequences may arise, however, for 
reasons that seem inappropriate or invalid, as when a person is rejected as a 
contractual partner on grounds of race, nationality, sex, sexual orientation, 
religion, union membership, or simply because his or her appearance is 
perceived as abnormal. 
The unfettered right to choose a partner and the correlative right to reject 
someone present market societies with a dilemma. On the one hand, the 
general commitment to freedom of the individual and a free market supports an 
unrestricted right to choose. On the other hand, the consequences of such 
choices on rejected groups may comprise a denial of equal opportunity in the 
market and social exclusion. Under the pressure of this dilemma, liberal 
societies have been rethinking the scope of the freedom to choose contractual 
partners. Laws prohibiting discrimination on invidious grounds have placed 
substantial restrictions on the right to reject a contractual partner. In the past, 
market transactions were typically regarded as part of the private realm, where 
individual choices should normally be respected by upholding contracts and by 
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respecting refusals to enter contracts. Now the freedom to choose a contractual 
partner is restricted by legislation in particular contexts (such as employment) 
combined with reference to particular criteria (such as sex, race, and disability). 
The task now is to understand how and why the new boundary is drawn 
between fields in which choices are constrained in the public interest and those 
in which the unfettered freedom to choose contractual partners is preserved. 
The private realm of the market, where choices of contractual partner are still 
none of the law’s business, outside of the regulatory controls of the anti-
discrimination laws, has certainly shrunk in the past half century. 
In order to understand how the new boundary around the private sphere in 
market transactions is drawn, section II explains why an analysis of the 
competing rights of individuals helps to illuminate the issue. Having described 
this framework of competing rights as a tool for explaining how the public 
interest may be understood in this context, the next section briefly describes the 
traditional protection afforded by the common law to unfettered freedom of 
choice of contractual partner. Section IV follows with an outline description of 
the scope of anti-discrimination laws in Europe and the United States, paying 
particular attention to the lines drawn between regulated market conduct and 
an unregulated private sphere. Section V explores an aspect of those laws that 
limits their scope to offers of sales and services to the public as opposed to 
purely private transactions. The sixth section then considers how this boundary 
drawn by anti-discrimination laws has been questioned by the European Court 
of Human Rights, perhaps to the extent of denying that any truly private sphere 
of unfettered choice should continue to exist. The concluding section assesses 
whether the freedom to choose a contractual partner has shrunk to a vanishing 
point under pressure from competing rights. The central claim is that once the 
legal framework is understood in terms of competing rights, there can be no 
remaining scope for an unregulated private sphere of freedom to choose a 
contractual partner. 
II 
RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
Traditionally, contract law is linked to a private realm, where individuals 
may pursue their own interests without being directed or controlled by public 
authorities. Nevertheless, as contracts form the basic units of the market, they 
cannot be excluded entirely from public scrutiny and legal regulation. As the 
major source of wealth and economic power, a competitive market has to be 
steered and safeguarded by legal interventions. In addition to measures to 
prevent market failures, political aims such as a fair distribution of wealth and 
power across the different groups of society can provide reasons for legislation 
to interfere with freedom of contract. Interventions usually take the form of 
either mandatory rules applicable to contracts or the invalidity of unfair terms 
or agreements that subvert public policy. These measures interfere with the 
freedom of the parties to choose the terms of their transactions. This article 
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focuses on interventions on grounds of public policy with respect to the other 
main dimension of freedom of contract or contractual autonomy: the freedom 
to choose a contractual partner. 
Public policy is concerned about the freedom to choose a contractual 
partner because that freedom may be exercised in ways that may be regarded as 
contrary to the public interest. For instance, the freedom to choose a 
contractual partner may be exercised negatively in a manner that is 
discriminatory on grounds of race, sex, or some other protected characteristic. 
Alternatively, the freedom to choose a contractual partner may be exercised 
positively in favour of certain categories of persons even though this preference 
harms the public interest. For instance, jobs in the public sector might be 
offered to friends or political supporters under a system of patronage without 
regard for ability to perform the job or the merits of other applicants. Both the 
negative and positive aspects of the freedom to choose a contractual partner 
may therefore provoke tensions between, on the one hand, respect for the 
freedom of the individual to choose the party with whom he or she wishes to 
associate, and, on the other hand, a public interest both in protecting the 
interests of others and in ensuring the public benefit of an open and competitive 
market. 
The tension in this context has traditionally been understood as a clash 
between negative liberty and the collective public interest. Negative liberty was 
famously described by Isiah Berlin: 
[T]here ought to exist a certain minimum area of personal freedom which must on no 
account be violated; for if it is overstepped, the individual will find himself in an area 
too narrow for even that minimum development of his natural faculties which alone 
makes it possible to pursue, and even to conceive, the various ends which men hold 
good or right or sacred. It follows that a frontier must be drawn between the area of 
private life and that of public authority.
1
 
This protection of a private zone is important in a liberal society, but its 
boundaries need to be set on this traditional view by considerations of public 
policy. Those policy concerns may relate to efficiency, social order, social 
justice, or other collective considerations. The touchstone of the boundary of 
the private zone has often been defined in the liberal tradition following J.S. 
Mill as depending on whether an act harms or injures others.2 
An alternative way of formulating the public interest constraint on the 
freedom to choose a contractual partner concentrates on the rights of the 
rejected contracting party. On this view, the scope of the public interest is 
determined by reference to the question whether, in the exercise of the freedom 
to choose a contractual partner, the choice involves an unjustifiable interference 
with the rights of others. Those rights of others involve aspects of personal 
 
 1.  ISIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 124 (1969).  
 2.  See H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963) (building on Mill’s statement that 
“the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.” JOHN STEWART MILL, ON LIBERTY 80 
(Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1869)).  
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autonomy and dignity. For the sake of their autonomy, individuals deserve to 
have a reasonable range of options open to them, without being excluded from 
market opportunities by reference to irrelevant personal characteristics, and for 
the sake of their dignity, individuals should be able to take pride in their 
identities.3  Under this approach, liberty is not limited to negative freedom from 
interference, but requires the law to promote the positive freedom or autonomy 
of all members of a society. This framework of analysis for investigating the 
appropriate restraints on the freedom to choose a contractual partner requires a 
balancing of competing rights. 
For instance, in Bull and Bull v. Hall and Preddy,4 the proprietors of a small 
hotel decided to exclude homosexual couples from rooms with a double bed on 
the ground that the proprietors regard such behavior—as with all sexual 
intercourse outside marriage5—as immoral and contrary to the tenets of their 
religious beliefs. This example frames the basic balancing analysis: should the 
decision to exclude be regarded as falling within the scope of the proprietors’ 
liberty to choose a contractual partner, or should the public interest require that 
any exclusion of homosexual couples from the hotel should be unlawful?  On 
the one hand, in addition to their demand for the freedom to choose a 
contractual partner, the proprietors can claim the support of other important 
rights such as freedom of religion and the right to exclude unwelcome people 
from their private property. On the other hand, the proprietors’ action certainly 
denies equal respect to homosexual couples, and in so doing strikes at the core 
ideas of individual dignity and liberty that underpin liberal democracies and 
human rights. It also denies respect for their right to respect for private and 
family life.6 
In this example, it is the proprietors’ preferences with respect to contractual 
partners that are questioned, but the tables can easily be turned. Suppose that a 
potential customer of the hotel discovers that the proprietor manifests his or 
her religion in various ways in the decoration of the premises, by for instance 
placing a large crucifix and a bible prominently in every room. As an ardent 
atheist, the customer objects to all religious symbols and prefers a strictly 
secular environment, so he or she decides to find alternative accommodation. 
 
 3.  This view of the meaning of autonomy in liberal thought is most closely associated with Joseph 
Raz. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986). For an application of this theory of 
autonomy to anti-discrimination laws, see John Gardner, Liberals and Unlawful Discrimination, 9 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1989). 
 4.  [2012] EWCA (Civ) 83 (Eng.).  
 5.  Under current U.K. law, it is not possible for homosexual couples to marry, though they can 
form a “civil partnership,” which has the same legal incidents as marriage. Civil Partnership Act, 2004, 
c.33 (U.K.). However, the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill, 2012–13, H.C. Bill [126], was laid before 
Parliament on January 25, 2013.  
 6.  Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which concerns the right to respect 
for private and family life, has been used frequently to protect the interests of gays and lesbians. 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8, opened 
for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953). For an example 
application, see Smith & Grady v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 493 (1999). 
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Can the customer’s decision be challenged on the ground that it involves 
disrespect to the proprietor’s religious beliefs and autonomy, or is the 
customer’s preference within the proper scope of the freedom to choose one’s 
contractual partner? 
This selection of the rights-based framework for examining these issues is 
prompted in part by the increasing use of this framework in Europe of human 
rights law in the sphere of markets and private law.7  In most European 
countries it is possible to challenge the traditional rules of private law 
applicable to contracts and torts by asserting sources of human rights law. In 
some instances, such as in Germany, the national constitution provides a fertile 
source of such arguments.8 In other countries, such as France9 and the United 
Kingdom,10 the source of rights is found in international conventions, 
particularly the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)11 and the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU).12 
The ECHR applies to all 47 member states of the Council of Europe. It 
permits individuals to bring a claim before the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) alleging that a state has interfered with a right unjustifiably or 
has failed to protect the individual’s right from unjustified interference.13 
Importantly, there is no simple “state action” requirement for there to be 
jurisdiction for an individual’s claim before the ECtHR, though only a state 
may be a defendant.14  Therefore, it is unnecessary to demonstrate that an 
agency of the state directly interfered with the right. Instead, it is sufficient that 
the laws of the state have failed to protect the individual’s right adequately 
against interference, including interference by another citizen or a business 
 
 7.  See OHLA O. CHEREDNYCHENKO, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, CONTRACT LAW AND THE 
PROTECTION OF THE WEAKER PARTY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONALISATION OF CONTRACT LAW, WITH EMPHASIS ON RISKY FINANCIAL 
TRANSACTIONS (2007); CHANTAL MAK, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW: A 
COMPARISON OF THE IMPACT OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ON CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS IN 
GERMANY, THE NETHERLANDS, ITALY AND ENGLAND (2008).  
 8.  See Jorg Fedtke, Germany: Drittwirkung in Germany, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PRIVATE 
SPHERE 125 (Dawn Oliver & Jorg Fedtke eds., 2007). 
 9.  See Myriam Hunter-Henin, France: Horizontal Application and the Triumph of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PRIVATE SPHERE, supra note 8, at 98. 
 10.  See Dawn Oliver, England and Wales: The Human Rights Act and the Private Sphere, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PRIVATE SPHERE, supra note 8, at 63. 
 11.  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra 
note 6. 
 12.  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 14, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 303) 1. 
 13.  Article 34 provides that all parties to the ECHR accept the right of “any person, non-
governmental organisation or group of individuals” claiming to be a victim of a breach of the 
Convention to bring an application. Under Protocol 11, both state and individual applications go to the 
ECtHR, which decides whether the application should be admitted for consideration on the merits. See 
generally D.J. HARRIS, M. O’BOYLE, E.P. BATES, C.M. BUCKLEY, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 4 (Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2009).  
 14.  See Mark Tushnet, The Issue of State Action/Horizontal Effect in Comparative Constitutional 
Law, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 79 (2003).  
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organization. Laws that fail to protect rights adequately may be found in either 
public or private law. 
In contrast, the CFREU does not permit direct claims regarding 
interference with rights. Instead, it requires the institutions of the European 
Union (EU) and the public authorities of Member States to apply EU law in a 
manner that is consistent with that declaration of rights.15  When applying EU 
law, both EU courts and national courts must interpret that law in a manner 
that is compatible with the protected fundamental rights. 
By these two means—both national constitutional law and transnational 
human rights law—individuals in Europe may challenge existing private law 
doctrines on the ground that they give insufficient weight to a particular human 
right. These challenges both defend individual rights and support the public 
interest in social justice.16  Rights establish a framework that both emphasizes 
the value of respect for rights as a contribution to the public interest and 
simultaneously demands that any other perspectives on the public interest, such 
as general welfare, should only be pursued to the extent that they can be 
properly reconciled with the need to respect rights. Unlike a public law context, 
however, both parties enjoy rights in disputes located in private law such as 
contract. The public interest requires a coherent and justifiable reconciliation of 
the competing rights of the parties. With respect to freedom to choose a 
contractual partner, in addition to the general protection of individual liberty or 
autonomy provided by human rights law, this dimension of contract law is most 
obviously related to the idea of freedom of association, but it also can be 
supported by reference to other rights in particular instances such as respect for 
private life, for freedom of expression, and for peaceful enjoyment of property. 
The competing rights of rejected partners for contracts will also include those 
fundamental freedoms, often with the additional element of a right to equal 
treatment. In order to balance the competing rights, European human rights 
law usually applies a test of proportionality: any interference with the freedom 
to choose a contractual partner must be for a legitimate purpose and only to an 
extent that is necessary and appropriate to pursue that goal; similarly, any 
interference with the right to equal treatment must be justified by the same test 
of proportionality. The reconciliation of the competing rights occurs through a 
double application of the proportionality test.17 
In the case of Bull and Bull v. Hall and Preddy,18 for instance, the 
proprietors of the bed and breakfast can invoke the rights to liberty including 
 
 15.  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 6, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 
1 [hereinafter TEU].   
 16.  See HUGH COLLINS, The Constitutionalisation of European Private Law As a Path to Social 
Justice?, in THE MANY CONCEPTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 133 (Hans-W. 
Micklitz ed., 2011). 
 17.  See, e.g., In re S (FC) (A Child), [2004] UKHL 47, [2005] AC 593, para.17; HUGH COLLINS, 
The (In)compatibility of Human Rights Discourse and Private Law 29–32 (London School of 
Economics, Law Department, Working Paper Series, 07/12, 2012). 
 18.  [2012] EWCA (Civ) 83 (Eng.). 
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freedom of association, to freedom of religion, and to peaceful enjoyment of 
their property as the foundation of their claim that they should be free to refuse 
a double bedroom to a gay couple. The test of proportionality requires an 
assessment whether the proposed interference with the rights of the proprietors 
is necessary and appropriate in the light of the legitimate purpose. Here the 
general aim of the legislation that forbids discrimination against gays and 
lesbians has to be examined and assessed with respect to the scope and weight 
of its demands. The analysis also requires an examination of whether the action 
of the proprietors involves an interference with the rights of the gay customers 
who wish to stay in the hotel. Their rights to dignity, equal respect, and respect 
for their private life must also be protected in a proportionate manner. 
III 
LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE  
FREEDOM TO CHOOSE A CONTRACTUAL PARTNER 
How does the law protect the freedom to choose a contractual partner? 
Most legal systems are committed to the basic principle of contract law that 
binding agreements only arise when both parties have consented to the 
agreement. That process of identifying consent to the contract is often analysed 
in terms of “offer and acceptance.” If A makes an offer to sell his book to B, it 
is not possible for a third person C to accept that offer and enter into a binding 
contract. The protection afforded by the law to the choice whether to enter a 
contract at all simultaneously protects the narrower choice whether to enter 
into a contract with a particular person. This latter aspect of freedom of 
contract permits us to choose, for instance, a more expensive airline offering a 
worse deal simply on the ground that its rival has a poor reputation in respect of 
matters which concern us personally, such as its refusal to recognize a trade 
union for the purposes of collective bargaining or its poor record on 
environmental matters. This dimension of the freedom to choose a contractual 
partner enables individuals to fit their market transactions into their broader 
schemes of values and preferences, thereby helping parties to feel comfortable 
with their choices and to achieve self-respect. 
This protection of the choice whether to enter into a contract at all is further 
strengthened by the legal rules that invalidate consent on the ground that it was 
obtained by force, fraud, undue influence, or mistake. For instance, the freedom 
to choose a contractual partner is protected by the law of duress, which 
invalidates a contract that has been induced by illegitimate coercion. If coercion 
has invalidated the consent given to a contract, it does not matter whether the 
coercion was designed to achieve a sale to a particular objectionable person or 
simply to force a sale in itself. Coercion negates the consent to any contract, 
without distinction as to the person. This protection of choice by the established 
legal doctrines for invalidating consent does not in general distinguish between 
the general case of the absence of consent to any contract and the particular 
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case of the absence of consent to a contract with a particular person. In some 
instances, however, this distinction can be identified in the law. 
Under the common law, in those unusual cases of mistaken identity in which 
the law permits the avoidance of a transaction, the particular identity of the 
other party is regarded as crucial. The justification for invalidating the contract 
is that, but for the mistake about the identity of the other party, the decision to 
enter the transaction would never have been made. English law protects this 
aspect of freedom of choice not only through the law of fraud—when someone 
deliberately conceals or lies about his or her identity—but also, and much more 
rarely, when there has been no misrepresentation but simply a unilateral 
mistake about the identity of the other person that was material to the decision 
to enter the contract.19  This anomaly in the common law, which in general 
precludes the ability to avoid a contract for unilateral mistake, emphasizes the 
importance of the narrow freedom to choose the person with whom one enters 
a contract. 
The controversial common law doctrine of undisclosed agency also involves 
situations in which the ability to select a particular contractual partner becomes 
significant. An undisclosed agency arises when a person sells goods or services 
to another, not being aware of the fact that the buyer is acting as an agent for a 
third person, the principal, to whom the seller would not be willing to transfer 
the goods or provide the service. In such cases, there is a willingness to enter 
into a contract of sale, but an absence of consent to a transaction with the 
undisclosed principal. In the general case when the seller is indifferent as to the 
identity and existence of the principal, the common law permits the principal a 
right of action—and grants the seller rights of action against both the agent and 
the principal. In the unusual case where the seller objects to the identity of the 
principal as purchaser,20 or had commercial reasons for selling to the agent in 
particular,21 it is arguable that the undisclosed principal should not be permitted 
to claim rights under the contract, because that would interfere with the seller’s 
freedom to choose a contractual partner. In general, however, the English 
courts have been reluctant to deprive the principal of contractual rights.22 The 
principle that the courts should uphold the bargain because it was both agreed 
and relied upon—even if under a mistake about the true identity of the 
counterparty—normally outweighs any concern about the infringement of the 
freedom to select one’s contractual partner. The doctrine of undisclosed agency 
is controversial precisely because it does not appear to give sufficient weight to 
the freedom to choose a particular party with whom to contract. 
 
 19.  See, e.g., Cundy v. Lindsay, (1878) 3 App. Cas. 459; Shogun Finance Ltd v. Hudson, [2004] 1 
All ER 215.  
 20.  See, e.g., Said v. Butt, [1920] All ER Rep 232; Dyster v. Randall & Sons, [1926] All ER Rep 
151. 
 21.  See, e.g., Greer v. Downs Supply Co., [1926] All ER Rep 675. 
 22.  See, e.g., Sin Yin Kwan v. Eastern Insurance Co. Ltd., [1994] A.C. 199 (U.K). 
05_COLLINS_BP_CORRECTION8_29 (DO NOT DELETE) 8/29/2013  3:06 PM 
No. 2 2013] THE VANISHING FREEDOM 79 
This article has discussed how the general principles of the law of contract 
governing consent protect both a wider freedom of choice whether to enter a 
contract at all and a narrow freedom to choose the particular contractual 
partner. These principles are regarded as foundational to the whole field of 
legally enforceable contracts. Before the advent of anti-discrimination laws, few 
exceptions were acknowledged. The earlier exceptions were primarily 
concerned with the granting of a license by a public authority to a private body 
to operate a monopoly service. Modern examples of this system of licenses also 
impose a duty to accept customers. For instance, in the United Kingdom, the 
Electricity Act 1989 provides that electric utilities have a duty to make a 
connection whenever requested by an occupier of premises.23  This duty is 
qualified in various ways, such as for safety concerns and impracticability, and 
through an indeterminate catch-all clause providing an exception “where it is 
not reasonable in all the circumstances” to make the connection.24 Apart from 
these regulatory intrusions on the freedom to choose a contractual partner, the 
common law also acknowledges some rare and narrow exceptions. 
Under the English common law, an innkeeper was not permitted to refuse 
to offer lodgings to a traveler if rooms were available.25 The purpose of this rule 
was presumably to assist people in need and to encourage travel for such 
purposes as commerce or pilgrimage. Subject only to rooms being available at 
the inn, the traveler could be assured of a legal right to lodgings for the night. 
This common law rule carved out a narrow exception from the general principle 
that one is free always to decline to enter a contract. But the principle was not 
so broad as to exclude entirely the innkeeper’s discretion to select a contractual 
partner, because the innkeeper could refuse entry to a person on reasonable 
grounds.26  Similarly, when the common law was extended by statute to hotels 
holding themselves out as offering food, drink, and accommodation to any 
traveler, the hotel was only obliged to accommodate travelers who appeared 
willing and able to pay a reasonable sum and who were in a fit state to be 
received.27 This duty to provide a service to the public does not apply to 
boarding houses, public houses, restaurants, and private residential hotels. 
Under these rules regarding innkeepers and analogous modern establishments 
that offer a service to the public, although the general freedom to choose 
whether to enter a contract is diminished to a considerable extent, the freedom 
to choose a contractual partner is only foregone to the extent that the innkeeper 
has no good reason or just cause for excluding the traveler. This objective test 
will no doubt examine the traveler’s sobriety, ability to pay, and other risks to 
the premises or other guests of the hotel.  
 
 23.  Electricity Act, 1989, c. 29, § 16(1) (Eng.). 
 24.  Id. at c. 29, § 17(1). 
 25.  See, e.g., Browne v Brandt, [1900–03] All ER Rep 118. 
 26.  See, e.g., Constantine v Imperial Hotels Ltd., [1944] K.B. 693. 
 27.  See Hotel Proprietors Act, 1956, c. 62. 
05_COLLINS_BP_CORRECTION8_29 (DO NOT DELETE) 8/29/2013  3:06 PM 
80 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 76:71 
There is, nevertheless, an important difference between an unfettered 
discretion to select a contractual partner and a limited freedom to refuse to 
contract with a particular person on reasonable grounds. Ultimately a court will 
determine whether the refusal to enter a contract with a particular person was 
reasonable or not. For instance, in 1943 a black professional cricketer from the 
West Indies was required to leave the Imperial Hotel in Russell Square in 
London on the ground that other guests, who were white military servicemen 
from the United States, objected to his presence.28 Even though there was no 
law against race discrimination at that time in the UK, the hotel was found 
liable to the cricketer for a nominal sum of £5 for having excluded a guest 
without proper reason.29 Here the hotel’s freedom of choice with respect to 
contractual partner was confined on the ground that it was an unreasonable 
exclusion. 
This brief survey of the common law that upholds the principle of the 
freedom to choose a contractual partner confirms that in general the law 
invalidates agreements when there has not been consent to the choice of 
contractual partner. It protects the choice of partner even when there has been 
a unilateral mistake, though normally a unilateral mistake about the character 
or subject matter of the contract would not suffice to justify the avoidance of 
the contract. Exceptions to the principle such as the rule applicable to 
innkeepers and the doctrine of undisclosed agency are strictly confined and 
treated as anomalous. 
IV 
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS 
The major exception to the freedom to select a contractual partner is now 
found in anti-discrimination laws. The European Union has enacted directives 
that apply not only to employment and occupation,30 but also to race31 and sex 
discrimination in entering contracts more generally.32 Although the directives 
have slightly different wording, the directive implementing the principle of 
equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods 
and services highlights the general principle applicable. Article 3.1 states, 
 
 28.  Constantine v Imperial Hotels Ltd., [1944] K.B. 693.  
 29.  The Race Relations Act 1965 was the first legislation against race discrimination in the United 
Kingdom.  
 30.  See, e.g., Council Directive 2000/78/EC, of 27 November 2000 Establishing a General 
Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16; Directive 
2006/54/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the Implementation of 
the Principle of Equal Opportunities and Equal Treatment of Men and Women in Matters of 
Employment and Occupation (Recast), 2006 O.J. (L 204) 23. 
 31.  See e.g., Council Directive 2000/43/EC, of 29 June 2000 Implementing the Principle of Equal 
Treatment Between Persons Irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin, 2000 O.J. (L 180) 22. 
 32.  See e.g., Council Directive 2004/113/EC, of 13 December 2004 Implementing the Principle of 
Equal Treatment Between Men and Women in the Access to and Supply of Goods and Services, 2004 
O.J. (L 373) 37. 
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Within the limits of the powers conferred upon the community, this Directive shall 
apply to all persons who provide goods and services, which are available to the public 
irrespective of the person concerned as regards both the public and private sectors, 
including public bodies, and which are offered outside the area of private and family 
life and the transactions carried out in this context.
33
 
The implication of this provision is that anyone who offers goods or services 
to the public has no right to discriminate between men and women either in the 
decision to enter the contract or in the terms offered. Article 3.1 is immediately 
qualified, however, by reference to the freedom to choose a contractual partner. 
Article 3.2 states, 
This Directive does not prejudice the individual’s freedom to choose a contractual 




This latter provision may simply be stating the obvious, namely that the 
legislation is concerned with sex discrimination and not other kinds of 
preferences. It is interesting, however, that it was thought necessary to reassert 
this fundamental freedom to choose a partner even as the freedom was being 
diminished. This provision may also serve the technical purpose of establishing 
that freedom to choose a contractual partner can be a legitimate aim for the 
purpose of the test of proportionality, so that measures that indirectly 
discriminate against women (or men) may be potentially justifiable simply on 
the ground that they uphold the broader principle of the freedom to select a 
contractual partner. 
EU directives have to be implemented through national legislation in order 
to become fully effective. For instance, in the United Kingdom there is the 
comprehensive Equality Act 2010 that covers all forms of prohibited 
discrimination. The key provision in respect of restrictions on the freedom to 
choose a contractual partner is section 29: 
(1) A person (a “service-provider”) concerned with the provision of a service to the 
public or a section of the public (for payment or not) must not discriminate against a 
person requiring the service by not providing the person with the service.
35
 
This national legislation has to be interpreted in a manner that, so far as 
possible, achieves an outcome consistent with the objective pursued by the 
directives.36  Furthermore, when there is a national provision that is 
incompatible with the fundamental EU principle of nondiscrimination, as 
 
 33.  Id. at 40. 
 34.  Id. There is no equivalent provision in the Race Directive.  
 35.  Equality Act, 2010, c.15, § 29(1) (U.K.).  
 36.  See, e.g., Joined Cases C-397-403/01, Pfeiffer v. Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband 
Waldshut eV, [2004] E.C.R. I-8835. 
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confirmed in Article 2 of the Treaty of European Union,37 a national court must 
decline to apply that provision.38 
Similarly, in the United States, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 introduced a 
major constraint on the freedom to choose a contractual partner.39 As well as 
closely regulating the labor market in Title VII for the purpose of eliminating 
sex and race discrimination,40 the Act also controlled the choice of partners in 
contracts for services in Title II, though only with respect to race.41 
(a) All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, 
facilities, and privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public 
accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on 
the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin. 
(b) Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a place of public 
accommodation within the meaning of this title if its operations affect commerce, or if 
discrimination or segregation by it is supported by State action: 
(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to 
transient guests, other than an establishment located within a building which 
contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied 
by the proprietor of such establishment as his residence; 
(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other 
facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises, 
including, but not limited to, any such facility located on the premises of any 
retail establishment, or any gasoline station; 
(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or 
other place of exhibition or entertainment. . . 
(e) The provisions of this title shall not apply to a private club or other establishment 
not in fact open to the public, except to the extent that the facilities of such 
establishment are made available to the customers or patrons of an establishment 
within the scope of subsection (b).
42
 
These provisions regarding discrimination in entering contracts for services 
and goods deserve closer inspection. Although the laws forbid discrimination in 
a wide range of contexts, their scope is limited. The freedom to choose a 
contractual partner persists in many instances. 
 
 37.  “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to 
minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, 
nondiscrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.” TEU 
art. 2. 
 38.  See Case C-555/07, Kucukdevici v. Swedex GmbH & Co. KG, [2010] I.R.L.R. 346 (CJEU). 
 39.  See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (Codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a–
2000a–6 (2006)). 
 40.  See id. at tit. VII. 
 41.  Other measures in the United States do protect women. See, e.g., Equal Credit Opportunity 
Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f (2006); Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604–3607 (2006). 
 42.  Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 201, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006). 
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V 
PRIVATE AND FAMILY LIFE 
A theme that runs through the anti-discrimination laws is an exclusion of 
private and family life. Although the legislation introduces controls over the 
freedom to choose a contractual partner, those controls do not apply in this 
remaining private sphere. According to Article 3 of the EU directive on gender 
discrimination,43 there appear to be three overlapping categories of exclusions: 
(1) transactions that are not concluded in the context of an offer to the public; 
(2) transactions in the context of private life; and (3) transactions in the context 
of family life. These exclusions do not map on to a distinction between 
transactions made in the course of business and sales by private individuals. For 
instance, if a private individual advertises a used bicycle for sale on a website or 
in a local newspaper, although that person is not operating as a business, the 
goods have been offered to the public, so that European anti-discrimination law 
applies. In contrast, if a man decides to sell his vineyard to his nephew rather 
than his niece on the ground that “only a man knows how to make good wine,” 
this sale (which is apparently not an offer to the public but a private sale) would 
be probably excluded on the ground that it falls within the area of private and 
family life. 
Though not expressly invoking the same exemption of transactions in the 
context of private and family life, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also 
draws a distinction between businesses providing services to the public and 
private transactions.44 Similarly, with respect to accommodation, it excludes 
private hotels not open to transient guests, and small boarding houses and bed 
and breakfast establishments where the owner resides on the premises. The 
Civil Rights Act also excludes private clubs, an exclusion not formally 
recognized in European law, though one that is likely to be possible in certain 
contexts such as a single-sex sports club.45  The scope of the Civil Rights Act 
seems narrower than the EU directive, because it focuses attention on 
businesses that are open to the public, such as hotels, restaurants, and theaters, 
whereas the directive applies not only to all businesses that offer goods and 
services to the public, but may apply to private individuals when they enter the 
general marketplace by offering goods and services. 
Applying these principles to the earlier example of staying at a hotel, it is 
evident that anti-discrimination laws draw a distinction between the hotel 
proprietor and the customer. The proprietor is offering a service to the public 
and is thus included within the prohibition against discrimination. In contrast, 
the prospective guest who decides to go elsewhere owing to her dislike of 
religious artifacts in a hotel is not covered by the legislation. As a private 
 
 43.  Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004, supra note 32. 
 44.  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a–2000a-6. 
 45.  See id. Under the UK Equality Act, 2010, §§ 101, 107 (U.K.), discrimination by an association 
of more than twenty-four members is prohibited. However, an association that restricts membership to 
a protected class (for example, women) is permitted with the exception of color (Schedule 16). 
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individual looking for a service, there remains an unfettered freedom to choose 
a contractual partner, even if the choice is exercised on such proscribed grounds 
as race, sex, and religion. 
Why should the law draw such a distinction between services offered to the 
public and private purchases? In both cases, a decision whether to enter a 
contract is affected by a personal characteristic of the other party. In both cases, 
the decision arguably involves treating the other person with less than equal 
respect and dignity. Anti-discrimination laws were created precisely to rule out 
such unequal treatment, not only in the public sphere, such as in voting and 
education, but also in the market sphere, such as in entering contracts. The 
argument that choices regarding contracting parties were a privileged area of 
autonomy, a matter of private and personal choice beyond the reach of public 
regulation, was rejected. Yet the removal of what John Gardner calls the 
“privacy” was incomplete46: consumers may discriminate in where they shop, 
workers can discriminate in their choice of employer, and family members may 
discriminate against each other. 
In a case involving the interpretation of the phrase “to the public or a 
section of the public” in earlier U.K. legislation, Lord Simon explained that 
every one of us plays a number of roles . . . . Certain of these roles lie in the public 
domain; others in the private or domestic. When the draughtsman used the words 
“provision to the public or a section of the public”, he was contemplating, I think, 
provision to persons aggregated in one or other of their public roles.
47
 
But this explanation of the purpose of the limitation on anti-discrimination 
laws is unhelpful, since it does not explain why an individual acting as a 
consumer or a worker is performing only a private role rather than a public one, 
while an employer or a hotel proprietor is performing a public role. 
Furthermore, this contrast between public and private roles is unhelpful 
precisely because the anti-discrimination laws challenge the traditional notion 
that the entire field of market transactions was regarded as private, a matter for 
unfettered individual choice. In the traditional liberal view, both the market and 
the family were part of the private sphere, beyond the reach of public controls 
and constitutional principles such as equal treatment. Anti-discrimination law 
questions that boundary and insists that at least some of the market (and the 
family) should be regarded as a public sphere that can be regulated. Finally, it 
should be observed that the invocation of a distinction between a public sphere 
and a private sphere will not prove instructive, because these terms are defined 
in opposition relative to each other: what is private is not public, and vice 
versa.48 
 
 46.  See John Gardner, Private Activities and Personal Autonomy: At the Margins of Anti-
discrimination Law, in DISCRIMINATION: THE LIMITS OF LAW 148, 149 (Bob Hepple & Erika 
Szyszczak eds., 1992). 
 47.  Charter v. Race Relations Board, [1973] 1 All ER 512, 527 (H.L.). 
 48.  See Hugh Collins, The Decline of Privacy in Private Law, 14 J.L. & SOC’Y 91 (1987). 
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VI 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
The ECtHR has addressed this question of how to determine the scope of 
anti-discrimination laws and their application to fields traditionally viewed as 
private, when individuals enjoy unfettered choice. Article 14 of the ECHR 
contains a general anti-discrimination principle: 
The enjoyment of rights and freedoms set forth in this convention shall be secured 
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national 
minority, property, birth or other status.
49
 
It is important to note that the provision is not restricted to a finite list of 
protected characteristics. On the other hand, to invoke Article 14, it is necessary 
to point to the interference with some other convention right, such as the right 
to liberty (Article 5), the right to respect for private and family life (Article 8), 
freedom of association (Article 11), or peaceful enjoyment of possessions (First 
Protocol, Article 1).50 Usually the ECtHR will hold that a discriminatory 
interference with a convention right cannot be justified and will therefore 
violate the ECHR.51 
The ECtHR considered the proper scope of the application of anti-
discrimination laws in private transactions in the context of a will drawn up in 
1939. In Pla and Puncernau v. Andorra,52 the question was whether a testator 
could discriminate in her will in favour of sons or grandsons “from a legitimate 
and canonical marriage.”53 In a dispute over inheritance of property under the 
will, the issue arose whether an adopted son of a married couple satisfied this 
requirement; if not, distant cousins would inherit the property. The issue was 
complicated by the absence at that time in Andorra of any laws governing 
adoption, such that it was unclear whether an adopted son should be granted 
equivalent rights to children born to the marriage. The court of first instance 
filled this gap inventively by applying the ius commune as found in the classical 
Roman law, which contained an elaborate law of adoption,54 and held that an 
adopted son satisfied the requirement in the will. This decision was reversed on 
 
 49.  European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 6 at art. XIV.  
 50.  See id. 
 51.  See, e.g., Thlimmenos v. Greece, App. No. 34369/97, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 15 (2000); see D.J. 
HARRIS ET. AL, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 13, at ch. 15. 
 52.  App. No. 69498/01, 2004-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 334. 
 53.  Id. at ¶ 12 (“El qui arribi a ésser hereu haurà forçosament de transmetre l’herència a un fill o 
net de legítim i canònic matrimoni . . . ”). 
 54.  Id. at ¶ 17 (According to the Civil Division of the Tribunal des Batlles of Andorra, “The 
Corpus Iuris provided for the institution of adoption and included in the word ‘child’, children born out 
of wedlock and adopted children . . . by providing for two forms of adoption: one undertaken under the 
authority of a princep and the other before a judge. The procedure followed in the first case was to ask 
the adoptive parent if he sought to take the adopted child as his legitimate child and to ask the adopted 
child if he consented. It was also stipulated that ‘a consanguineous relationship is not instituted by deed 
but by birth or solemn adoption’ (Diocletian and Maximianus, Codi 4, 19, 13). Furthermore, ‘the 
father-child bond is not created by mere declarations or false assertions, even if both parties consent, 
but only by lawful marriage or solemn adoption’ (Diocletian and Maximianus, Codi 4, 19, 14).”). 
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appeal to the Andorran High Court on the ground that Catalan law, which 
usually applies in Andorra, does not recognize adoption, so the child was not 
“from” and not an “offspring” of the marriage. On a reference to the Andorran 
Constitutional Court, the Court held that there was no violation of the 
constitutional requirement of equal treatment for the reason that a testator 
enjoys the freedom to discriminate between different children and relatives 
when making a will. 
When the adopted son took his case to Strasbourg, the ECtHR was divided 
five to two.55 The majority held that both Article 8 (the right to respect for 
private and family life) and Article 14 were engaged.56 The Court held that the 
Andorra’s High Court’s interpretation of the will was plainly wrong on the 
ground that an adopted child was “from” a marriage.57  Furthermore, the High 
Court’s interpretation had a discriminatory effect against adopted children, 
contrary to Article 14.58 The ECtHR would not normally challenge a judicial 
decision about domestic private law, but it would intervene under the 
Convention “if the national courts’ assessment of the facts or domestic law were 
manifestly unreasonable or arbitrary or blatantly inconsistent with the 
fundamental principles of the Convention.”59 Since the will did not explicitly 
exclude adopted children, an interpretation should be applied that avoided the 
discriminatory effect. The majority of the Court therefore treated the judicial 
interpretation of a will as a kind of public act, so that a state is required to 
ensure that any interference with the rights of others, such as the right to 
respect for private and family life of the adopted son in this case, should not be 
conducted on a discriminatory basis. 
In contrast, in a minority judgment Judge Garlicki insisted that a testator’s 
right to dispose of her property as she wished was an aspect of the right to 
property and her right to privacy under Article 8.60 Indeed, as Dean Spielmann 
has observed, “There is merit in the submission that the whole idea of a will 
might well be to depart from the general system of inheritance and to 
discriminate.”61  Judge Bratza articulated for the minority the traditional 
separation of public and private spheres: 
The fact that, under the Convention, the legislative or judicial organs of the State are 
precluded from discriminating between individuals (by, for instance, creating 
distinctions based on biological or adoptive links between children and parents in the 
enjoyment of inheritance rights) does not mean that private individuals are similarly 
 
 55.  Pla and Puncernau, App. No. 69498/01, 2004-VIII Eur. Ct. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. For effective criticism of this interpretation, see Richard S. Kay, The European Convention 
on Human Rights and the Control of Private Law, 5 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 466, 469 (2005).  
 58.  Pla and Purcenau, App. No. 69498/01, 2004-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 
 59.  Id. at ¶ 46.  
 60.  App. No. 69498/01, 2004-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. (minority opinion of Garlicki, J.). 
 61.  Dean Spielmann, The European Convention on Human Rights: The European Court of 
Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PRIVATE SPHERE, supra note 8, at 427, 440. 
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In the view of the minority, as a protected convention right, the testator’s 
freedom to make this personal decision could only be restricted in exceptional 
circumstances. Such exceptional circumstances would only arise when the 
disposition in the will was repugnant to the fundamental ideals of the 
Convention or aimed at the destruction of protected rights and freedoms. In 
this case, however, by leaving property only to children born to the marriage 
and excluding illegitimate and adopted children, the testator had acted within 
her rights and freedoms and the will should be enforced in accordance with its 
interpretation by the Andorran High Court. 
Although this case concerns a will rather than a contract, similar principles 
should surely apply. As the majority observed, 
[T]he Court is not in theory required to settle disputes of a purely private nature. That 
being said, in exercising the European supervision incumbent on it, it cannot remain 
passive where a national court’s interpretation of a legal act, be it a testamentary 
disposition, a private contract, a public document, a statutory provision or an 
administrative practice appears unreasonable, arbitrary or, as in the present case, 
blatantly inconsistent with the prohibition of discrimination established by Article 14 
and more broadly with the principles underlying the Convention . . . .
63
 
The majority of the ECtHR reduces the exclusion of private and family life 
from the scope of anti-discrimination laws almost to the vanishing point. The 
testator is not acting in the course of business or making offers to the public. On 
the contrary, she is making a private decision about the distribution of her 
property among her relatives and descendents after her death. Nevertheless, the 
majority of ECtHR does not accept that the anti-discrimination principle is so 
limited in the context of private transactions and the family. Indeed, the court is 
pushing the anti-discrimination principle into the heart of the family by 
requiring equal treatment for adopted children, and, presumably, between the 
sexes. 
VII 
THE END OF THE PRIVATE SPHERE 
The acknowledgment of the rights of the rejected party forces a 
reconsideration of the largely unfettered right to choose a contractual partner. 
By applying rights to relations between private persons, the legal analysis shifts 
from the issue of whether some public policy should constrain the exercise of 
freedom of choice towards an inquiry that carefully measures the competing 
rights and justification for restrictions placed upon them by the law. The 
ECtHR has revealed in Pla and Puncernau v. Andorra how a legal analysis that 
demands respect for the rights of a rejected person has the potential to justify 
regulation not only of services offered to the public, as conceived by current 
 
 62.  Pla and Puncernau, App. No. 69498/01, 2004-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 4 (minority opinion of 
Bratza, J.). 
 63.  Id. at ¶ 59.  
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anti-discrimination laws, but also to private and family exchanges. These 
developments call into question the sharp contrast highlighted earlier in our 
discussion of anti-discrimination law between the regulation of businesses 
offering goods and services to the public and the absence of regulation of 
personal decisions by consumers and workers to use discriminatory preferences 
in their shopping and job searches. 
This expansion of the constitutional and human rights review of private law 
clearly presents a challenge to democratically approved legislation and raises 
difficult questions about the balance between conflicting rights. But it serves the 
valuable purpose of undermining the emphasis in private law on negative 
liberty, epitomized by the ideas of freedom of contract and protection of 
property rights. Instead, by balancing the rights of both parties, the legal 
analysis is forced to take into account the real choices available to both parties 
and respect the autonomy of both by measuring the relative importance of their 
rights by reference to a test of proportionality, which may afford greater scope 
for a more adequate reconciliation of their interests.64  In this way, the public 
interest is better served by the insertion of human rights in private law. 
The inevitable consequence of the analysis in terms of competing rights is, 
however, that a completely insulated private sphere cannot exist any longer. 
Every choice or rejection of a contractual partner may be challenged on the 
ground that it disproportionately and unjustifiably interferes with the rights of 





 64.  For a similar analysis in the context of property rights, see generally Oliver Gerstenberg, 
Private Law and the New European Constitutional Settlement, 10 EUR. L. J. 6, 766 (2004).  
